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SITUATING SCHAUER
L.A. Powe, Jr.*
Three years ago, The University of Texas Law School hosted a
two day symposium on Philip Bobbitt's Constitutional Interpretation' and
Fred Schauer's Playing by the Rules.2 At one point my colleague Bill
Powers commented to me how different Philip and Fred were, and yet
what extraordinarily able legal philosophers they were. I didn't doubt
Bill, but what a move up the academic food chain. The last time Fred
had been at the law school for an extended time was a decade earlier
when he was simply one of the best First Amendment scholars of his
generation. At that time, Fred presented a paper identifying his First
Amendment with Freddie Patek.
Patek wouldn't have been my choice. When I think of the First
Amendment, I think of George Anastaplo, Pat Tornillo, or Fred Cook.
Anastaplo, a would-be lawyer, struck out with the Illinois Bar.3
Tornillo, a would-be state representative, struck out with the voters,4
but blamed the Miami Herald.5 Cook, a liberal freelance writer, struck
out with the Reverends Billy James Hargis and John M. Norris, but,
playing for the Democratic National Committee, 6 hit major league
home runs at the Federal Communications Commission and the
United States Supreme Court.7 When Patek struck out, at least it was
in the Bigs;8 he was a 5'5" shortstop (mostly) for the Kansas City
* Anne Green Regents Chair, The University of Texas. I would like to thank my
colleagues David Anderson, Doug Laycock, Sandy Levinson, and Bill Powers for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this essay.
1 PHILIP BOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991).
2 FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RuLEs (1991).
3 When I took Constitutional Law in the mid-1960s, no case outraged me so
much as In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961). Years later as a law professor, I felt privi-
leged to be an outside reference on Anastaplo's being tenured as a political science
professor.
4 L.A. Powe, Jr., Tornillo, 1987 Sup. CT. REv. 345 (1987).
5 Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
6 LucAs A. PowE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FiRsr AMENDMENT
112-17 (1987).
7 Cook was the complainant in Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
8 In Patek's fourteen-year career he struck out 787 times in 5530 official at bats.
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Royals and the symbol of what Schauer believes the First Amendment
should be, lean and mean.9 Still, if Patek were a trump card, he'd be a
six.
George Anastaplo was a very lucky martyr. He wasn't mutilated
or killed and he has been able to celebrate his martyrdom with friends
and admirers for decades: ever since the United States Supreme Court
placed its imprimatur on the Illinois Bar Association's requirement
that, to be admitted to that elite organization, Anastaplo had to tell
them whether he was then or had ever been a member of the Commu-
nist Party. Although Anastaplo had passed the bar exam and had ref-
erences detailing not just good, but superb moral character, the
Illinois Bar wanted to know, because Anastaplo had raised a red flag
on his application form by acknowledging his belief in the principles
of the Declaration of Independence. The Bar's personal history form
asked applications to "State what you consider to be the principles
underlying the Constitution of the United States." Anastaplo gave a
good paragraph that ended with "[a] nd, of course, whenever the par-
ticular government in power becomes destructive of these ends [Life,
Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness], it is the right of the people to
alter or abolish it and thereupon to establish a new government." 10
Because the Illinois Bar apparently believed that anyone believing the
people have a right to alter or abolish a government denying the right
to life, liberty or the pursuit of happiness sounded like a communist
(now a Freeman, perhaps), they demanded that Anastaplo tell more.
But Anastaplo believed that the First Amendment of that Constitution
precluded inquiry into his beliefs, so he refused. He was denied ad-
mission to the bar and has never subsequently been admitted."1
Timing is everything. Anastaplo would not have been martyred if
his case had been heard by the Court just one year later. Instead he
would have won (and he would now be a lawyer). Had his case been
argued in 1962, it likely would have been paired with Florida's effort
to investigate whether the NAACP had been infiltrated by commu-
nists. 12 In that case, the anti-communist NAACP was not entirely con-
vinced that Florida was truly interested in protecting the civil rights
organization from communist influence. Florida's request for the
9 Schauer has never reduced his Patek metaphor to print, but informs me he still
uses it orally and continues to believe it is apt.
10 In reAnastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 99 (1961).
11 Andrew Patner, The Quest of George Anastaplo, CHICAGO 185 (Dec. 1982).
12 Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigating Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
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NAACP's membership list looked, to the NAACP at least, suspiciously
like the similar efforts of Alabama.' 3 A southern state would hope to
obtain membership lists and then sit back and see if a little private
action might happen to any of the listed people.14 The Supreme
Court, however, had blocked Alabama's efforts to get the membership
lists. Florida's case was different, however, because, adopting a newer
strategy, it tied racism with red baiting and trusted that neutral princi-
ples of constitutional law would allow it to succeed where Alabama
had failed. Florida was initially correct as the same five justices' 5 who
voted against Anastaplo also voted against the NAACP, 16 applying the
same neutral principle-if a government sees red, the First Amend-
ment runs up the white flag-to decide the case.' 7 But then Justice
Frankfurter had his stroke and the case could not come down that
year. When Arthur Goldberg replaced Frankfurter, the case was rear-
gued and the NAACP won over an anguished dissent that could not
figure out why neutral principles were being so wantonly sacrificed.
The NAACP victory-or Frankfurter's stroke, take your choice-
signaled the beginnings of the true Warren Court, a grouping of five
to six or seven votes for civil liberties or civil rights claimants that
would last for a decade.' 8 Had Anastaplo's case been decided after
Franfurter's stroke, there is no doubt that he would have won because
all the domestic red cases came out that way. Indeed by 1967 the
Court ruled that it was unconstitutional to ban a member of the com-
munist party from employment at a defense facility! ' 9
Similar although necessarily less drastic moves were apparent
across the First Amendment spectrum.20 Libel, wholly unprotected,21
not only became protected, it was deemed to implicate the central
meaning of the First Amendment.22 Obscenity law moved so fast that
13 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
14 Sheldon v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (dealing with a similar request in
Arkansas).
15 Justices Frankfurter, Clark, Harlan, Whittaker, and Stewart.
16 LA. Powe, Jr., Does Footnote Four Describe , 11 CONs'r. CoMMiENTARY 197, 203-04
(1994).
17 LA. Powe, Jr., Justice Douglas After Fifty Years, 6 CONST. COMMErNTARY 267,
281-83 (1989).
18 Powe, supra note 16; LA. Powe, Jr., The Court Between Hegemonies, 49 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 31 (1992).
19 United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
20 LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 79-105
(1991).
21 Chaplinskyv. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250 (1952), Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49 n.10 (1961).
22 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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during Frankfurter's last three years the Court had to decide whether
the theme of the movie version of Lady Chatterly's Lover was obscene, 23
while at the end of the decade I Am Curious (Yellow) became the first
mass audience X-style movie, and it would have been held constitu-
tionally protected ifJustice Douglas were not forced to recuse himself
during Gerald Ford's effort to impeach him. 24 While Miller25 cut back
on the seeming Redrup26-Stanley 7 protection of obscenity (whatever it
was), the law and the country had changed. Something equally appar-
ent was involved in the Court's new synthesis in Brandenburg28 that
virtually moved all subversive advocacy into protected speech. Cohen
v. California29 completed the sweep. Words that everyone "knew"
could not be used in public, could; indeed they could be used in a
courthouse-or at a school board meeting.30 Then, in a Bicentennial
celebration, that Court found commercial speech constitutionally pro-
tected 3' and the key provisions of the sweeping post-Watergate cam-
paign finance regulations unconstitutional. 32 Holmes to the contrary
notwithstanding, freedom of speech was an abstraction that was decid-
ing hard cases.
II
Schauer's First Amendment scholarly career can best be under-
stood as a thoughtful reaction to what he perceived as the Warren and
Burger Court excesses and the cheerleading of the period's two lead-
ing First Amendment scholars, Thomas Emerson and Harry Kalven.
Schauer was the first of his generation to conclude that the Court
went too far. He has articulated the view that First Amendmentjuris-
prudence ought not be abstract while at the same time recognizing
that abstraction has been "central . . . to the operation of the First
Amendment. '3 3 Thus, his First Amendment scholarly corpus looks to
a more restrained First Amendment than the Court has created. To
23 Kingsley Pictures v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
24 Grove Press, Inc. v. Maryland State Bd. of Censors, 401 U.S. 480 (1971) (4-4
decision; Douglas, J., not participating).
25 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
26 Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
27 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
28 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
29 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
30 Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972).
31 Virginia State Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
32 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
33 Frederick Schauer, Harry Kalven and the Perils of Particularism, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
397, 409 (1989) [hereinafter Schauer, Perils of Particularism].
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be sure, the First Amendment is a trump, but equally surely it is not
the ace of trumps.34 Hence Freddie Patek.
For those coming into the field after the Warren Court, as well as
Kalven's and Emerson's explications, there were two major avenues
their scholarship could take: a doctrinal area (commercial speech, li-
bel, 'mass communications, etc) or theory. Schauer began with the
former, but quickly moved to theory, and subsequently his First
Amendment focus gave way, in the late 1980s, to the even broader
issue of legal theory generally.
Schauer's initial writing was on the newly created law of obscen-
ity. He first wrote a short treatise 35 and then followed with a thought
provoking article in the Georgetown Law Journal36 that completely
split him from the prevailing academic orthodoxy. He began with
heresy-the Burger Court got it right: "The Supreme Court can be
right and prevailing academic criticism can be wrong about the same
substantive issue."37 He rejected the conclusion that the Court had
not gone far enough 'in protecting sexually explicit speech; instead he
argued that obscenity (and hard core pornography) were not speech
at all and therefore deserved no constitutional protection.
Schauer's views on obscenity can best be understood within the
perspective of a contemporaneous article he wrote on the chilling ef-
fect.38 This article, written twenty years after Justice Brennan's Speiser
v. Randall 39 was a true rarity (in print at least) for its understanding
that Speiser had been a major, if ignored, First Amendment contribu-
tion. The importance of Speiser was Brennan's recognition that First
Amendment rights could be lost to good faith but erroneous fact find-
ing. To use an easy example, it is unfortunate if ajury finds a motorist
was doing thirty-five in a thirty when the motorist wasn't driving that
fast. Unfortunate, but not a constitutional wrong; there is no constitu-
tional right to drive at any speed. But if ajury finds that advocacy of
speeding was really an incitement to speed or that Carnal Knowledge is
hard core pornography, it is more than unfortunate because in these
cases the fact finder has erroneously turned constitutionally protected
34 FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 9 (1982) [herein-
after FREE SPEECH].
35 FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY (1976).
36 Frederick Schauer, Speech and "Speech'--Obscenity and "Obscenity', 67 GEO. LJ.
899 (1979) [hereinafter Schauer, Obscenity].
37 Id. at 899.
38 Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unravelling the "Chilling
Effect, 58 B.U. L. REv. 685 (1978).
39 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
1997] 1523
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
speech into unprotected speech. The speaker is therefore punished
for doing what the Constitution gives her a complete right to do.
As Schauer resurrected Speiser from its undeserved obscurity, he
demonstrated that a key function of the chilling effect doctrine is to
preclude erroneous fact finding; this is done by overprotecting speech
(and, especially after Bose,4° vigorous appellate fact review). Even
though some categories of speech are unprotected, the Court protects
a portion of that unprotected speech to guarantee that truly protected
speech is never found unprotected. Visually this can be illustrated (as
Schauer did) by a line divided at the midpoint between constitution-
ally protected and unprotected speech. Applicaton of the chilling ef-
fect requires a redrawing into (say) thirds where only the final third
can be punished. The sixth (sorry for the math) that is on the unpro-
tected side of the middle but nevertheless judicially protected from
sanction is that "breathing space" Brennan concluded that speech
needed to survive.41 It also represents the cost to legitimate state in-
terests of the overprotection of speech.42
The Court's obscenity opinions were so terrible that it is diffi-
cult 43 Was the Court marching hand in hand with society's sexual
revolution? Or was the Court trying to ensure that society's censors,
always years behind the times, were prevented from blocking access to
(arguably) worthwhile materials? At least prior to Miller44(and maybe
after), it seems impossible to tell. Schauer, however, was sure that
only the latter was proper, thatJenkins v. Georgia45 guaranteed its effec-
tuation, and that this-despite the Court's opinions46-was what the
Court was doing. From Schauer's (as well as the Court's) perspective,
nothing of constitutional significance was included within the obscen-
ity definition. Schauer understood, seemingly better than anyone
else, that there had been a glacial shift away from the days when one
worried whether Henry Miller's Tropic of Cancer might fall prey to the
censor.
47
Because of his chilling effect analysis, Schauer had no concern
over the inherent vagueness of obscenity terminology. The Court pro-
40 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
41 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
42 Schauer, Perils of Particularism, supra note 33, at 407.
43 Whether this comes from confusion or Brennan's penchant for gobbledygook
compromises remains unclear. Given Brennan's refusal to use Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557 (1969), I think it is the former.
44 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
45 418 U.S. 153 (1974) (involving the film entitled Carnal Knowledge).
46 Schauer, Obscenity, supra note 36, at 900.
47 Grove Press, Inc. v. Gerstein, 378 U.S. 577 (1964) (per curiam).
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scribed "hard core pornography."48 Justice Stewart had gained fame
for assuming the term was obvious.49 Schauer thought so too. His
operative definition concluded that even though depictions need not
include sexual acts, they could still be hard core pornography and
that this was a class of materials readily distinguishable 50 from "mere
nudity,"51 as if these were the only possibilities. In Schauer's view,
consistent with the First Amendment, a lot of existing sexually ori-
ented materials could be proscribed. Thus Schauer rejected Bren-
nan's newfound vagueness concerns because they had already been
dealt with in setting the constitutional line. Any difficulties of inter-
pretation necessarily came on the fringe,5 2 and the fringe was already
covered via the definition of obscenity.
Prior to the McKinnon-Dworkin discovery of the harms imposed
by sexually oriented materials (that they disapprove of), the dominant
assumption, as expressed by the 1970 United States Commission on
Pornography and Obscenity, was that obscenity caused no harms. 53
Paris Adult Theatre I v. SlatonM unintentionally underscored the con-
clusion when it ascribed an environmental quality-of-life harm to ob-
scenity and then naturally found that that harm justified regulation.
Paris Adult simply proved the problem with obscenity as perceived by
the academic critics. If such a soft rationale for regulation can trump
a speech claim, then, logically, it can do so everywhere and the entire
speech-protective edifice could be destroyed. Schauer, by contrast,
found harm irrelevant. "The fact that there may be no good reason
for regulating obscenity does not ipso facto render it protected
speech."55
Obscenity was Schauer's wedge into the ultimate free speech is-
sues of "why" we protected speech. Because the Constitution singles
out speech (and not giraffes56), the Court must supply a definition of
speech, one that (presumably) will distinguish it from the broad range
of (other) human activity. For Schauer, speech in the constitutional
sense was about "the communication of a mental stimulus"5 7 and ob-
48 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), says so five times.
49 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197-98 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
50 SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENrry, supra note 35, at 113 ("reasonably obvious"
distinction).
51 Id. at 112.
52 Schauer, Obscenity, supra note 36, at 909.
53 UNITED STATES COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY & OBSCENITY, THE REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY (1970).
54 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
55 Schauer, Obscenity, supra note 36, at 914.
56 Id. at 911.
57 Rd. at 921.
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scenity was therefore not speech because it was nothing beyond a sex-
aid: the communication of a physical stimulus. Carnal Knowledge was
not (and could not be) obscene because it engaged the mind; Deep
Throat was obscene because it engaged only the sex organs.
III
Schauer's obscenity scholarship in the 1970s led him in three di-
rections. First, and most importantly, it led him to seek a philosophi-
cal basis for freedom of speech, and it is here that his reputation as a
premier scholar was fully established. This, in turn, led him to legal
theory generally where he has emerged, again, as head of the field.
But, third, it led him to the 1986 Attorney General's Commission on
Pornography and the writing of the key parts of its report. This gave
him more controversy than scholars normally enjoy.
The Report defined pornography as sexually explicit materials in-
tended primarily for purposes of sexual arousal,58 but definition was
not the key point. The point was rather a new (and novel) classifica-
tion that the Commission felt better described the available materials.
Sexually oriented materials fell into one of four classes: the violent,
the degrading, the nondegrading (consensual sex based on equality),
and nudity without a significant sexual message. Category three, the
nondegrading, was, in the Commission's view, virtually a null set;
there just wasn't much of it in existence. This set the tone; there was
too much sexually explicit material available and it was just the wrong
kind.
With the materials categorized, the Commission turned to harm.
There is significant social science evidence that combining violence
with any sexual material causes harms, especially illegal aggression
against women.59 In the most controversial aspect of the Report,
Schauer, while expressing less confidence in the conclusion, extrapo-
lated from the evidence on violent materials to conclude that the
same harmful effects came from degrading materials (by far the larg-
est class of materials in the Commission's view) as well. This conclu-
sion has not set well with those who know the social science literature.
Although Schauer has taken grief for the Report, he did not
change his earlier views to pander to the right. What he appears to
have done is make more explicit what was already implicit in his ear-
58 ATToRNEY GENERAL'S COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTIcE, FINAL
REPORT 228-29 (1986).
59 There is also a lot of social science evidence that violence without sexual materi-
als causes harms. See THOMAS G. KRATENMAFR & LUCAS A. POWE, JR., REGULATING
BROADCAST PROGRAMMING 120-32 (1994).
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ier work. In his Georgetown article he stated that "pornography, par-
ticularly pictorial pornography, is covered, if at all, only at the fringes
of the First Amendment."60 Under Schauer's approach that meant
that the materials had little or no appeal to the cognitive functions
and therefore were valueless (even if accidentally protected). It goes
without saying that Schauer has a contested view of the value of por-
nography (however defined). One does not see any recognition of
potentially utopian (even if to treat it as dystopian) aspects of compre-
hending a new freedom. Nor is there any statement compatible with
that of Robin West who noted that women's "experiences of pornog-
raphy have been more than just diverse, they have been profoundly
contradictory" ranging from "damaged, brutalized, or more generally
simply oppressed by it" to "on occasion be [ing] liberated by [itl."61
Given Schauer's views that pornography was of no value, he could
have, and should have, found harm irrelevant in his large category of
degrading materials. In his postmortem on the Report, he stated that
he read the Report to limit obscenity prosecutions "to the sexually vio-
lent .... [I] t is that message, about the relationship between sexual
violence and the legitimating images of sexual violence that are all
around us, that the Report, in the final analysis, is all about."62 That
has not been the common reading of the Report, but after an initial
flurry of (hostile) commentary, the Report dropped from view (and
reading). Rather than continue the futile debate, Schauer immedi-
ately returned to the broader philosophical issues he had staked out
earlier.
IV
Schauer was the first of his generation 63 to suggest that the Court
was right on obscenity and the first to sugggest it had gone too far
generally in protecting speech. He was also first and instrumental in
creating the awareness that speech was not costless; it imposed harms
on its targets. When virtually everyone (indeed, maybe virtually is un-
necessary) was cheerleading for the press, Schauer wrote a devastating
(and to my knowledge unanswerable and unanswered) critique of the
Court's public figure libel jurisprudence. His point can be summa-
rized instantly: an elected official may be able to save himself from an
60 Schauer, Obscenity, supra note 36, at 909 n.62 (emphasis added).
61 Robin West, Pornography as a Legal Text: Comments from a Legal Perspective, in FOR
ADULT USERS ONLY, 108, 109 (Susan Gubar & Joan Hoff eds., 1989).
62 Frederick Schauer, Causation Theory and the Causes of Sexual Violence, 1987 AM. B.
FOUND. REs. J. 737, 769-70.
63 The cohort to enter law teaching in the warm afterglow of the Warren Court.
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attack by the press; but a run-of-the-mill public figure (it could be a
law professor charged with sexual misconduct by the National Law
Journal) cannot; and furthermore, the story about the public figure is
nowhere as likely to be at the core of the First Amendment as one
about a public official. 64 This doctrinal critique has not been an-
swered. Mention it and you will hear the words "chilling effect."
By contrast, Schauer's philosophical work came rather late in the
First Amendment debates. Until the mid-1960s the dominant ques-
tion about freedom of speech was "how much" protection should it
receive. The Warren Court breakthrough answered that question by
"plenty"-as close to "no law" as possible-and possibly, following
Redrup and Stanley, not even excepting obscenity. This turned the rel-
evant question to "how?" By what means should expression be pro-
tected? The switch in questions made explicit what had been implicit
for a long time. Freedom of speech enjoyed a very special position in
our constitutional hierarchy. Indeed, only Robert Bork, arguing that
no one could take the First Amendment literally and that its history
was unhelpful, had raised the question of why all this speech was pro-
tected.65 Bork's explicit point, which served him poorly at his Confir-
mation hearings, was that it shouldn't be. By the mid-1970s, others
were looking to sources other than language, history, and experience
to justify the Court's expansive reading of the First Amendment's
guarantees.
Frank Michelman had pioneered the idea that the Constitution
(or at least the Fourteenth Amendment) was best interpreted accord-
ing to the precepts of moral philosophy (very specifically John
Rawls'). By the time Schauer's obscenity work appeared, First Amend-
ment scholars were also turning to philosophy for interpretive gui-
dance. Schauer's contribution here was not originality; it was
thoroughness. No one has done it better.
For years the critics of the Court's obscenity decisions had asked
"why do we regulate this?" and the Court either could not or would not
answer. When it finally offered its environmental-quality rationale in
Paris Adult that answer was, to virtually all but Schauer, unsatisfying
(because, if applied generally, it would swallow protected speech).
When Schauer approached the issue, he inverted the question, mak-
ing it "why do we protect this?"-especially when the "this" (including
the material in the breathing space) was, in his opinion, nothing but a
sex aid.
64 Frederick Schauer, Public Figures, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 905 (1984).
65 Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. LJ.
1 (1971).
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Following the path already laid out, Schauer had no trouble re-
jecting Holmes' marketplace of ideas as a possibility. Hard core por-
nography was a physical stimulus, not an idea. Similarly, obscenity was
not a discussion of public affairs such that it could gain protection
through the need of the polity to be able to engage in discussions of
all aspects of public policy.
Nor did we need to protect obscenity to (over)compensate for
government propensity to undervalue the materials, because the chil-
ling effect doctrine had already done that. Protecting obscenity could
be justified only by a liberty-autonomy rationale for the First Amend-
ment. Bork's famous Neutral Principles article had already undermined
that rationale.66 Lots of things-education, travel, drugs-could fall
under that liberty-autonomy rationale, and they could not be reason-
ably distinguished from speech in this respect. Accordingly, the ra-
tionale was too broad and had to be rejected.
Having shown how the rationales worked with obscenity, Schauer
turned to them more generally in his powerful synthesis, Free Speech: A
Philosophical Inquiy.67 No one could read this tight book without con-
cluding that, first, Schauer was exceptionally rigorous and, second, in
his hands the case for a strong protection of freedom of speech didn't
seem all that strong. The rationales for protection were dissected, one
by one, and found, in most cases, wanting.
Because Milton, Mill and Holmes all supported freedom of
speech as a means of determining what is true, the universal starting
point of a theory of free speech is the argument from truth which
Holmes tied into his "marketplace of ideas." Implicit in the argument
from truth is that truth is both knowable and valuable. While the lat-
ter seems more or less self-evident (but consider naming a rape vic-
tim), the former is quite contested. Whatever the allure of scientific
(or philosophical) truth, what most people talk and write about-say
the nature of poverty or why baseball is in a long term decline-are
mushy. Furthermore, the analysis presupposes a level of rationality
that may only be achievable in certain areas and by certain individuals.
Worse, once the marketplace enters, so do market imperfections like
entry barriers and oligopolistic power. Truth may be ascertainable
when discussing a falling object, but it is less so when discussing the
nature of campaign finance.
As Schauer notes, the argument from truth therefore works best
with Galileo. It also highlights the important question of who gets to
decide: the people as individuals or the authoritative few (or many)
66 Id.
67 SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH, supra note 34.
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who hold power. Schauer demonstrates that truth is a frail reed for
freedom of speech and this explains why those invoking it (in some
form) typically now use it as a justification for abridging, not protect-
ing, speech.
A stronger, perhaps the strongest, justification for free speech is
that it is a necessary precondition for democratic government. The
people need to deliberate all policies, criticize those in power, and
make wise decisions in the voting booth. Free speech is central to
each.
But what about speech that is not about governing? This, of
course, was Schauer's entry into the area; obscenity has nothing to do
with speech about government. But the problem goes deeper; neither
does commercial speech, nor Shakespeare, Darwin, nor something
truly important like a strike in professional sports. 68 If speech is pro-
tected only when it directly relates to public policy, then the vast range
of speech and writing of most Americans is left without any constitu-
tional protection. It would be ironic if the demand that government
not abridge freedom of speech meant that government could-if it
wished-censor virtually at will so long as it left speech about public
policy alone. Even Alexander Meiklejohn, with whom protection only
for speech about governing is most closely identified, balked at this,
although in so doing he eviscerated his own distinction between pub-
lic and private speech by placing everything in the former category.69
Schauer correctly noted that the "narrowness of the argument from
democracy is also its greatest strength"70 and Meiklejohn's switch
sapped the idea of its cogency. For Schauer, unlike some who fol-
lowed him, the theory behind emphasizing speech about government
was to offer higher protection for certain speech, not to eliminate pro-
tection for the speech most people engage in.
Both the argument from truth and from government speech saw
free speech as instrumental, and instrumental arguments can always
be trumped. Thus in the 1970s there was an effort to place free
speech on a more secure footing by making it an end instead ofjust a
means. That was the allure of the liberty-autonomy rationale. Free
speech is an inherent aspect of human dignity necessary for individual
self-fulfillment. Schauer's obscenity writing had rejected this possibil-
68 If the strike is in baseball, many will mistakenly believe that it implicates base-
ball's antitrust exemption and therefore is about government policy. But instead of
thinking "antitrust exemption," the observer should be thinking "Coase Theorem."
LA. Powe, Jr., What Does Bo Know?, 82 VA. L. REV. 1369, 1378, 1380 n.81 (1996).
69 Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV.
245.
70 SCHAUER, FREnE SPEECH, supra note 34, at 44.
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ity because it failed to distinguish speech from other activities. Never-
theless Free Speech split his discussions into two chapters, one on
speech "and the good life," the other on speech and individual auton-
omy. This allowed Schauer to follow Tim Scanlon's recognition that
there ought to be individual autonomy in "deciding what to believe
and weighing competing reasons for action."7 Schauer saw this as
limiting the rationale to speech as opposed to the whole host of inter-
ests that surround liberty generally, and wisely recognized (as his ear-
lier work did not) that autonomy was a contribution to free speech
theory.72 After all (although he did not use this example) when one
justifies West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette73 on speech
(rather than religious) grounds autonomy has a more realistic ring
than government speech.
Surprisingly, in a book subtitled A Philosophical Inquiry, Schauer
turned lastly to what he saw as psychological utilitarian defense of free
speech. Those in power have the most to lose from open discussion
and it is hardly surprising that they will take steps-including censor-
ship-to keep what they have.74  Thus Schauer states that
"[e]xperience arguably shows that governments are particularly bad
at censorship, that they are less capable of regulating speech than they
are of regulating other forms of conduct."75 Schauer saw this justifica-
tion as negative; it is not so much that free speech is very valuable;
rather it is that it is more valuable than those in government think.7 6
They will misweigh the costs and benefits to the detriment of society
and hence protection of speech is "necessary merely to counter the
tendency towards over-regulation." Others, especially Vincent Blasi77
and myself, would have gone farther. Schauer might have relabelled
this chapter to speak in terms of history and tradition rather than psy-
chology, but that was not Schauer's approach. Had he been more
interested in history, he might have further addressed whether judges
71 Id at 69 (relying on Thomas Scanlon, A Theory ofFreedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 204 (1972)).
72 Id- at 71.
73 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
74 As John Roche so nicely put it: "Power corrupts, but fear of losing power cor-
rupts absolutely." Quoted in PowE, supra note 20, at 238.
75 SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH, supra note 34, at 81.
76 In Schauer's more recent work I detect more sympathy for this rationale. See
Frederick Schauer, Judicial Review of the Devices of Democracy, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 1326
(1994) [hereinafter Schauer, Devices of Democracy].
77 See Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM.
L. REv. 449 (1985).
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are capable of protecting speech or other civil liberties during crisis
times or whether speech is a good times civil liberty.78
It was possible (I know because at the time I did) to read Free
Speech as stating that which ever rationale the reader chose, there is
less to the protection of speech than was thought. Basically Schauer
seemed to say "choose a unitary rationale and face the consequences."
That was not his point, however, and Free Speech should be read in
conjunction with three law review essays published immediately in its
wake. Indeed these articles Codifying the First Amendment: New York v.
Ferber,79 Must Speech Be Special?,80 and An Essay on Constitutional Lan-
guage8 l are best seen as part and parcel of the book.
Codifying the First Amendment made clear that Schauer believed we
have "several First Amendments" and thus a unitary theory was not the
sole option.8 2 Each of the various theories generated justifications for
protecting certain types of speech. Government speech generates
cases such as New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.83 Truth explains academic
freedom cases like Sweezy84 and Pico.85 Excessive censorships creates
Jenkins8 6 or Southeastern Promotions;,87 indeed these were "perhaps even
based in part on notions of self-realization."88 These examples were
"representative rather than exhaustive" but they showed Schauer did
not limit himself to a preferred theory of protection. There is nothing
78 My position is that it is the latter. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494
(1951), or any of the wartime cases. Indeed, I can think of no case during times of
great strain when the Court has protected civil liberties in an unpopular decision. To
this proposition, my distinguished colleague Charles Alan Wright dissents, and cites
ExparteMernyman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487), and West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Neither makes it. Menyman was
decided by ChiefJustice Taney to facilitate Maryland's secession from the Union. Bar-
nette overruled Minem-ville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), which was a
hugely unpopular decision. I love the Barnette opinion too, but do not find it an act of
courage or a decision going against popular belief. My view is that if Wright could
have thought of a third example, he would have.
79 Frederick Schauer, Codiffing the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 Sup.
CT. REV. 285 [hereinafter Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment].
80 Frederick Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78 N.W.U. L. REv. 1284 (1984)
[hereinafter Schauer, Special].
81 Frederick Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language, 29 UCLA L. REV. 797
(1982) [hereinafter Schauer, Constitutional Language].
82 Schauer, Codifying the First Amendmen supra note 79, at 313.
83 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
84 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
85 Island Trees Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
86 Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
87 Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
88 Schauer, Specia supra note 80, at 1304.
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to indicate that he thought the various theories were reinforcing, cre-
ating a sum greater than the whole of their parts. Emerson had come
to this conclusion and it is my own view as well, but I doubt Schauer
agrees. If speech comes within the sweep of one of the theories, he
will protect it; but he doesn't stretch and if the speech doesn't come
within one, he wouldn't.
Free Speech left two important points open. First, why should we
protect speech and not other self-actualizing activities? In the words
of his article, "must speech be special?" Is it special? Second, what did
the book have to do with the First Amendment? Constitutional Lan-
guage dealt with this second question.
"Must speech be special?" had been Schauer's theme for several
years. He closed the essay of the same name with an apt description
of where his philosophy had taken him during that time:
As we reject many of the classical platitudes about freedom of
speech and engage in somewhat more rigorous analysis, trying to
discover why speech-potentially harmful and dangerous, often of-
fensive, and the instrument of evil as often as good-should be
treated as it is, our intuitions about the value of free speech, solid as
they may be, are difficult to reconcile with this analysis. The ache, it
seems to me, is caused by the fact that although the answer to "Must
speech be special?" is probably 'Yes," the answer to "Is speech spe-
cial?" is probably "No."8 9
That conclusion was probably the driving force behind his schol-
arship. His -blunt statement that "over-inclusive First Amendment
rulemaking is accompanied by an under-inclusive accommodation of
legitimate state interests" 90 is one I would associate with no one else.
Through all this Schauer had not seriously addressed his thesis
that philosophy was an/the appropriate guide to the First Amend-
ment. When it all came together, however, Schauer was articulating a
philosophical imperialism. At least parts of law were not autonomous;
rather they were a subdiscipline of philosophy. Free Speech stated at the
beginning that philosophy was necessary for legal analysis. Schauer
thus bemoaned the prior lack of attention to the "philosophical foun-
dations" of the area; it was both "philosophically disturbing" and "defi-
cient legal analysis."91 Thus without philosophy legal analysis of
freedom of speech is necessarily incomplete.
Beginning with the obvious point that freedom of speech cannot
be taken literally, Schauer turned to how to define it. It must be inter-
89 Id at 1306.
90 Schauer, Perils of Particularism, supra note 33, at 407.
91 SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH, supra note 34, at ix.
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preted "in light of some underlying purpose or theory."92 Because
freedom of speech is not self-defining, it is a theory-laden term that
necessarily sends us "outside the legal domain and into the moral or
the political."93 We must define it there, and in its definition we re-
strict its applications to the underlying theory. Thus even though a
user of the term may be unaware of the underlying theory, "the
speaker is committed to the theory ... even if the speaker did not
intend the result."94 If that is the case it is no wonder that Schauer
detailed the limits of the underlying philosophies in Free Speech with
such care. Justices and scholars may have been misusing the terms
and giving the First Amendment a latitude that philosophical the-
ory-and therefore constitutional law-did not justify.
V
So what's missing in Schauer's work? I think it is the United
States of America. Schauer, quite intentionally I think, wrote about a
free floating freedom of speech, as applicable in Estonia as in Evans-
ton. My perspective is much more limited. I do not care how a system
of freedom of expression works in Eastern Europe (or Western Eu-
rope for that matter); I am very much concerned about how it has
worked in the United States. I am interested in how our Constitution
operates. I thus have a limited temporal and geographic interest.
Schauer does not.95
If the question is what does our Constitution mandate (rather
than what does free speech require), then we must answer the ques-
tion as lawyers and not as philosophers. It is both trite and obvious
that the framers and ratifiers of the First Amendment left no clues
that their work could best be understood against a philosophical back-
drop. Nor have there been any suggestions in the past 200 plus years
that a philosopher would be a useful appointee to the Supreme Court
(although Schauer, complete with aJ.D., would). The Constitution is
about the American experience, not the proceedings of the Cam-
bridge Philosophical Union (no matter how learned).
Philip Bobbitt quite rightly describes doing constitutional law as
applying the accepted techniques of constitutional interpretation to
92 Schauer, Special supra note 80, at 1298-99.
93 Schauer, Constitutional Language, supra note 81, at 827.
94 Id. at 825.
95 See Frederick Schauer, Free Speech and the Cultural Contingency of Constitutional
Categories, 14 CARDozo L. REV. 865 (1993).
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the problem at hand.96 Those techniques are applying text, history,
structure, doctrine, consequentialism, and the meaning of the Ameri-
can experience. Philosophy enters, if at all, as a parasite on one of the
other modalities of interpretation (typically consequentialism).
Schauer quite obviously disagrees. It is undoubtedly true that Schauer
sees his work as set against (and as supplementing) the backdrop of
all the other scholarship emphasizing nonphilosophical approaches
to the First Amendment. But that, I think, misses the point, for
Schauer not only believes that philosophy is necessary for First
Amendment analysis, he finds it an independent and superior modal-
ity of analysis. 97
From my perspective it is ironic that Schauer, the advocate of
thinking small and the articulate opponent of abstracting issues, 98
grounds his interpretation in philosophy. A better (and potentially,
but not necessarily, more particularistic) method would be to discuss
the tradition of free speech. Look to the Sedition Act controversy,
World War I, McCarthyism, the civil rights movement, Vietnam, ob-
scenity regulation, broadcast regulations, the political correctness
movement; these offer a treasure of lessons and applications of the
First Amendment that philosophy cannot hope to duplicate. Further-
more, these events are grounded in our history and are therefore part
of our heritage.
Yet it seems no accident that history is missing from Schauer's
writing. I suspect his disdain for history is matched only by my disdain
for philosophy.99 When Schauer turns to the lessons drawn from ex-
perience, there usually aren't any lessons. When there are some, he
notes that they are anecdotal and could be amplified by the tools of
history or political science, but his interest is "more theoretical than
empirical."' 00  Another time he wrote that "experience arguably
shows,"'' x although that seems to understate the sweep of the Ameri-
can First Amendment experience. Emerson's work alone shows (and
most First Amendment scholars agreed) that when American govern-
ments can regulate speech they will do so to favor their friends, censor
96 PHILIP BOB=rr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982);
BBBITT, supra note 1.
97 Indeed, he said so at the symposium I mentioned in the opening paragraph.
Philip Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 72 TEx. L. REv. 1869, 1911 (1994).
98 Schauer, Perils of Particularism, supra note 83, at 408.
99 I always thought Shakespeare got it wrong. Begin with the philosophers, then,
if necessary, move to lawyers.
100 Frederick Schauer, The Political Incidence of the Free Speech Principl 64 U. CoLO.
L. REv. 935, 946 (1993) [hereinafter Schauer, Political Incidence].
101 SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH, supra note 34, at 81 (emphasis added).
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their opponents, and in general use power in a most partisan fashion.
My initial book on broadcast regulation was designed to show that the
abuses postulated by Emerson and existing First Amendment theory
for any regulatory regime, had, in fact, occurred in the regulation of
radio and television. There were enough that I could write a book
detailing them.
It is not just that Schauer has not written a book about govern-
ment abuses, he has not written an article either. He has shown con-
cern that the Ocala Star-Banner, by its negligence, blocked Crystal River
Mayor Leonard Damron's chance to be elected county tax assessor10 2
by identifying him (instead of his brother) as having been charged
with perjury in federal court.10 3 But there is nothing on the First
Amendment paradigm of the lone dissenter, whether he be Thomas
Patterson, Jacob Abrams, Dirk Dejonge, George Anastaplo, David
O'Brien or even John Peter Zenger. Nothing. I believe this is truly
unique in important First Amendment scholarship. One answer is
that the First Amendment paradigm of the lone dissenter was obsolete
during Schauer's career. The cutting edge issues were the electronic
media, government speech, and campaign finance, yet he largely ig-
nored them, as well (although that may be changing).104
Finally, to come to what always has interested Schauer, harms, I
wish he would reverse his focus just once. Nowhere does he seem as
skeptical about the costs of speech as he does about its benefits.
Maybe once this was a justified counter to preexisting dogma, but his
own writings have transformed that dogma. That speech imposes
harms is established. What remains at issue is how much harm (in a
world where much is typically defined either criminally or in dollars).
In Uncoupling Free Speech'0 5 he used his old favorite Damron and
the Ocala Star-Banner. Ajury awarded Damron $22,000-Schauer lets
us know that fourteen times in the article. 10 6 Schauer also cites Olivia
N. v. NBC,10 7 a case where a California appellate court held that even
if the television movie Born Innocent, describing a prison rape using a
"plumber's helper," had caused a like rape of the nine-year-old de-
fendant by teenage boys who had seen the movie days before, the
102 Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971).
103 Schauer, Public Figures, supra note 64, at 910.
104 E.g., Schauer, Political Incidence, supra note 100; Schauer, Devices of Democracy,
supra note 76.
105 Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLuM. L. REV. 1321 (1992)
[hereinafter Schauer, Uncoupling].
106 Id. (discussing Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971)).
107 126 Cal. App. 3d 488 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444 (1969)).
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Brandenburg test precluded liability. But for the First Amendment,
Schauer states ajury would have been justified "in awarding damages
to Olivia N. in the amount of, say, $20,000."108 Stop right there. Why
is Damron's injury ten percent greater than Olivia N.'s? Is it that true
that words wound more than physical force?109 Furthermore, Dam-
ron's jury award is thirty years in the past, before the exponential ex-
plosion of tort damages. Today an "incalculable" injury may and
often will mean "astronomical" instead of not capable of calculation.
In Olivia N. $20,000,000 is a more likely verdict than $20,000. For
Schauer to suggest $20,000 in 1992 shows that he has distanced him-
self completely from how the tort system now works. Put somewhat
differently, this is a huge example of his one-sided examination of
cost.
Neither Schauer nor I are constitutional perfectionists."I0 We
know the Constitution cannot weigh costs and benefits the way a per-
fect system might, and we both oppose that part of modem constitu-
tional law scholarship that assumes the Constitution incorporates all
that is light (and precludes all that is wrong). The First Amendment
is hardly alone among constitutional provisions in imposing costs that
those who must bear them most resent." Schauer's First Amend-
ment fine-tuning may be somewhat closer to a desire for perfection
than he otherwise believes appropriate.
VI
So what's Schauer's contribution? Plenty. He is the critic that
Emerson and Kalven did not have, but needed and would have
respected. He is the person who would have deflated their views on
the value of speech. And he is the person who would never let them
forget that what they loved so much harmed others (often less power-
ful others).
Unlike Emerson's and Kalven's era, ours does not lack for First
Amendment critics: MacKinnon," 2 Matsuda,113 Fiss," 4 Sunstein," 5 to
108 Schauer, Uncoupling, supra note 105, at 1346.
109 I once asked Gerry Spence (who had won both trials) how Karen Silkwood's
lethal exposure to uranium could be worth the same as Kimerli Jayne Pring's sup-
posed injury from a Penthouse story never naming her, and I received an extraordina-
rily hostile nonanswer.
110 Schauer, Deuices of Democracy, supra note 76, at 1344-46.
111 Just imagine how the relatives of victims of the Oklahoma City bombing would
react if the trial judge excludes the evidence relating to Terry Nichols.
112 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993).
113 Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87
MIcH. L. REv. 2320 (1989).
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name just a few. But the former two seem unidimensional, seeing the
universe through the prism of the single issue they care about. And
the latter two each have created a principle outside the First Amend-
ment, given it an evocative name,116 and then claimed the true consti-
tutional issue was application of that principle to the problems at
hand. Schauer is so different. His is a critique from within and from
top to bottom.
Furthermore, if Freddie Patek is not an apt symbol for the First
Amendment, he nevertheless offers the beginning of an apt descrip-
tion of a Schauer article. If not lean and mean, then hammering logic
with no excess verbiage. Schauer chooses manageable topics and
then manages them well-indeed, I can think of no one better able to
spot worthwhile First Amendment topics. Yet unlike Patek, who struck
out too often, Schauer always moves the runner along, often past
home plate. He is what every scholar needs-and dreads: that con-
summate, hardheaded, but totally fair, critic. Thanks Fred.
114 Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405 (1986);
Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARv. L. REV. 781 (1987).
115 CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993).
116 One wonders why neither selected the "free speech fairness doctrine."
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